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"
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BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
-,,

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellants, John Cunningham and Dennis
Lrker, appeal from a conviction of the unlawful
.le of an hallucinogenic drug and the sentence
tposed thereon in the Third Judicial District
1urt, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellants were tried on a charge of the un1wful sale of LSD, contrary to Utah Code Ann.

58-33-6 (1)

(1953) (Supp. 1969), before the

1norable Joseph G. Jeppson, sitting without a
Lry.

Upon a verdict of guilty appellants were

:ntenced on July 20, 1970, to a term of imprison-
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nt at the Utah State Prison; and appeal from the
dgment and sentence.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellants seek reversal of the judgment
the lower court and dismissal of the action,
in the alternative, reversal and remand for
rther proceedings, with directions and instrucons for modification and correction of the
ntence.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
During late November, 1969, a well co-ordin~d

team of undercover agents under the direct-

1

and control of Loni Deland, an employee of

~

Utah Liquor Law Enforcement Division, chanced
make the acquaintence of appellant Cunningham
the apartment of one Mike Fellows.

The team

agents subsequently approached the appellants
their apartment at 329 East Seventh South,
Lt Lake City, and asked if appellants could
>ply them with a quant:ity of LSD.
:asions the response was negative.

On several
(R. 77-80)

On the evening of December 3, 1969, the
'ee agents again arrived at appellant's apart-

tt sometime after 10: 00 p. m.; and .'!ft er gaining
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into the apartment, presented the appel-

~ntry

_ants with a variety of pretenses as to why the
1gents had to have the illegal drug.

After

tbout thirty minutes of sp•) cadic conversation
ind repcated frequent and insistent demands
rom the agents that appellants supply them with
SD, the appellants finally capitulated to the
emands, and allegedly delivered over eight tabets of the drug.

The agents threw a $20 bill

n the floor for payment.

(R. 82-84)

The appellants, 19-year old boys from a
nall town in Idaho, had been in Salt Lake City
nly a short time and testified that they were
iving in a rough neighborhood and that they
:quiesced in the transaction only because they
~re

becoming fearful of the agents and hoped

1at if they gove the agents what they were ask1g for that they would go away and leave them
Lone.

( R.

8 3, 9 2)

The appellants further testi-

Led that they had been experimenting with LSD,
iat they were not selling or dealing in drugs,
~ that they were merely casual users and that

te tablets in question were in their possession
•lely for their own personal use.

( R.

90)
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On December 5, 1969, appellants were arres~d

and charged with the unlawful sale of an

1llucinogenic drug to agent DeLand.

They were

·rested at gunpoint and their apartment

w~s

toroughly searched but no other drugs were
,un d .

( R . 9 5- 9 6 )

On the trial of the case the appellants
ised the defense of entrapment based upon the
nner and means

used by the agents to finally

f ect a purchase including the repeated and
rsistent demands that appellants supply these
ents with the drug.

In spite of the entrap-

nt issue the trial Court found both defendants
ilty as charged.

(R. 105)

Before sentencing, counsel for the appellants
gued in favor of the Court's consideration of
obation, but the trial judge, the Honorable
seph G. Jeppson, automatically sentenced the
pellants to imprisonment at the State Prison
r the "indetermin~te term provided by law·"
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ARGUMENT I
APPELLANTS WERE DEPRIVED OF A FAIR TRIAL AND
UE PROCESS OF LAW FOR THE REASON THAT THE TRIAL
OURT ERRONEOUSLY CONSTRUED THE DEFENSE OF ENTRAPTHE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE STATE WAS INENT.
UFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF FACT AND AS A MATTER
F LAW TO REBUT THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE.
Entrapment has been defined as the inducement
f one "to commit a crime not contemplated by him
or the mere purpose of instituting a criminal
rosecution against him.

It has also been

ef ined as the

and planning of an

conce~'tion

ffense by an officer and the procurement of its
)mmission by one who would not have perpetrated
~

except for the trickery, persuasion or fraud

f the officer.

rim.

See Vol. 21 Am. Jur. 2d,§ 143

Law. and cases cited therein.

The defense of entrapment most generally
!cepted in the United States has its roots in
ie

ma.iority opinjori in Sorrells v. U'1itecl

;ates,

257 U.S. J35 (1932), which held that en-

'apment is established:
Wlien the criminal design originates with the
officials of the government and they implant
in the mind of an·~ innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offens~ and induce its commission in order that they may
prosecute. 11
11
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he controlling question is:
"Whether the defendant is et person otherwise
innocent whom the government is seeking to
punish for an alleged offense which is the
product of the creative activity of its own
officials."
lring the days of Prohibition Sorrells sold some
iquor to a government agent who posed as a mem~r

of Sorrells' World War I Army division.

The

liskey was forthcoming onl) afte1· several re1ests had been

ma~~\;

The Court in Sorrells adopted the so-called
>rig in of intent" test, a subjective test that
!quires determining whether the defendant or the
1vernment agent conceived, planned, or caused
1nunission of the crime.

By allowing an inquiry

1to the defendant's past criminal record or
·ior suspicious conduct the requisite elements
predisposition and criminal design may be
termined; and the defense is valid if the dendant lacked the prior intent to commit the
ime charged.
The rule and rationale of Sorrells was ref irmed in the case of Sherman v. United States,

6 U.S.

369 (1958).

In Sherman the factual

sue was whether the informer had convinced an

-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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>therwise unwilling person to commit a criminal
let or whether petitioner was already predispo 6 cd
;o commit the act and exhibited only the natural
tesitancy of one acquainted with the narcotics
.rade .

The Court found that a number of repiti-

.ions of a request to supply narcotics predicated
1n the informer's presumed suffering had preceded
Le defendant's final acquiescence to supply some
:_rugs.

The Court found that a single request

·as not enough and that the informant made numerus requests in order to overcome first the deendant' s refusal and his evasiveness and finally
is hesitancy in order to achieve capitulation.
he Court found that the series of sales were not
ndependent acts subsequent to the inducement but
art of a course of conduct which was the product
f the inducement.
It appears that the defense of entrapment as
t

exists in the state of Utah, is quite similar

o the rules set forth in Sorrells and Sherman,
upra.

In the case of State v. Pacheco, 15 Utah

d 148, 369 P. 2d 494, it was stated:
"For a peace officer to procure a person to
commit a crime which he otherwise would not
have committed for the purpose of apprehending

-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and prosecuting him is entrapment.
This is
so discordant to the true function of law
enforcement, which is the prosecution, not
the causation of crime; and so repugnant to
fundamental concepts of justice that the conviction of an accused under such circumstances will not be approved.
When that issue is
present the question is whether the crime is
the product of the defendant's own intention
and desire or is the product of some enticement or inducement by the peace officer.
If
the crime was in fact so instigated or induced
by what the officer did that the latter's conduct w:c~s the generating cause which produced
the crime and without which it would not have
been committed, the defendant ohould not be
convicted.
On the other hand, if the defendant 1 s attitude of mind was such that he desired and intended to commit the crime, the
mere fact that an officer or someone else
afforded him an opportunity to commit it
would not constitute an entrapment which
would be a defense to its commission; and
this would not be less true even though
an undercover man went along with the def endant in the criminal plan and aided or encouraged him in it."
n the Pacheco case the defendant was convicted
n the bci.sis of a burglary and grand larceny
harge in which one of several individuals who
erpet:r·ated the crime was, unbeknownst to the ·
efendant, a police officer who tipped off the
)lice that the crime was about to occur, with
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m undercover officer.

Acting on a tip from this

.nformant, the defendant and the others were
tpprehended shortly after the burglary with an
mount of money in his possession.

Although

hat persuasion which overcomes natural relucance on the part of innocent persons to commit
crime which he is

~ot

otherwise disposed to

o is "entrapment," it is noted that the Court
ust draw a

line between entrapping innocent,

nwary people who are not inclined to commit
rime and entrapping the unwary criminal who
till gets caught in his own schemes because of
is misplaced confidence.

This Court affirmed the Pacheco reasoning
l

the case of State v. Perkins, 19 Utah 2d 421,

j2 P.

2d 50 (1967).

In Perkins the defendant

Lrst approached the agent inquiring whether he
~sired

to make further purchases of drugs.

tere was some evidence that the undercover agent
td made prior purchases of marijuana from the
~fendant.

The agent asked whether Perkins

1uld get him a cap of heroin and Perkins quoted
m a price; he left the bar shortly thereafter
d attempted to purchase some drugs.

The
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defendant although unable to obtain heroin, returned after a short time and sold the officer
five joints of marijuana.

On the trial of that

the entrapment issue was raised indirectly

~ase

>n cross-examination and the defendant did not
;ake the stand.

The fact that there was sub-

;tantial evidence in the case of prior contacts
1etween the defendant and the same agent involvng other transactions was allowed to show a pre-

lisposition.
This Court has had occasion to interpret and
urther construe the the0ry of the entrapment
efense in the re:'.ent decision of State v. Kasai,

7 Utah 2d 326, 495 P. 2d 1265, wherein it was
tated that:
Entrapment is not established as a matter of
law where there is any substantial evidence
in the reco1·d from which it may be inf erred
that the criminal intent to commit the particular offense originated in the mind of the
accused.
The f~ct that a government agent
offers to buy narcotics from a suspect, thus
giving him the opportunity to commit the
offense, does not constitute entrapment·"
11

The "origin-of-intent" test, being subjective,
ls

been recently the subject of some criticism·
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:ee ULR Vol. 1971, Swnmer, No.

:ases cited therein.

2,

@

p. 266, and

It would appear that the

rend is toward the position set out in the conurring opinions of Sorrells and Sherman, that
he determination of entrapment as a matter of
aw requires the objective examination of the
olice conduct.

In Sherman the concurring jud-

es were of the opinion that the Court reversed
he conviction because of the conduct of the
nf ormer, and not because the government failed
o draw a convincing picture of the past crimial conduct, even though the majority found no
intent.

11

It could be contended in the instant case,
s it was in Sherman and Kasai, that the entrapent is no defense on the theory that the offiers "merely afforded an opportunity" to one
predisposed" to sell.

A careful comparison of

he facts in the case reveals that Kasai may be
eadily distinguished.
In Kasai,

an old acquaintance and former drug

ddict, acting as a police informant, approached
he defendant, who was changing a tire on his
~r,

anct requested marijuana.

The informer

2lped the defendant change the tire and then
-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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>oth went into the house where the defendant proluced a "lid."

A f cw minutes later the informant

eft the house and turned the evidence over to
raiting police.

There was other evidence admit-

ed at the trial of that case tending to estabish that there had been at least one prior
ale to the same informant, and that no unusual
ersuasion was apparently involved.
There is no evidence in the case at bar
hich proves beyond a reasonable doubt the state
f mind or predisposition which

11

readily res-

onds11 to the 11 opportunity" created by the offiers.

On the contrary, it is clear that the

olice conduct was the generating cause which
roduced the crime, and without which it would
Dt have been committed.
Appellants respectfully submit that the test
ecently adopted by the Kansas Supreme Court in
1e case of State v. Reichenberger, 209 Kan.
LO, 405 P.

2d 919, should be applied here.

The

insas Court, after carefully discussing the
Lstorical developments in this area of the law,
lted that where the events culminating in a
'iminal offense commence with a police solici-
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ation, the defense of entrapment will almost
lways present a question of fact.

When there

s no proof of conduct on the part of the
efendants prior to the police solicitation, only
n "uncensurable solicitation" met by

11

ready

ompliance" may be some evidence of predisposiion.

The further test of predi-position then formu~ted

is

whe~her

the type of police persuasion

sed creates a "substantial risk 11 that such
ff enses will be committed by persons other than

1ose who are ready to commit them.

This f ormu-

1tion was also suggested in the Model Penal Code
~oposed

Official Draft, § 2.13 (1962).

The instant case clearly is one of police
>licitation involving a substantial risk of
tducing innocent persons to commit a crime
tich they otherwise would not have attempted.
tere can be little doubt but that the transtion was brought about through a persistent,
·rceful, and insistent series of demands by
e officers that appellants pro~uce drugs for
em.

The fact that appellants had only a few

blets in their possession is entirely consis-
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ent with their explanation that they were, at

ost, mere users, and that the only motivation
o

11

sell11 was due to the fear induced by the

gents.

The Reichenberger case indicates that

nusual or persistent inducements by policP may
e sufficient to raise an entrapment defense
equiring acquittal.
In conclusion, appellants submit that in
his case a public law enforcement official along
ith persons acting in co-operation with that
ff icial perpetrated an entrapment solely for

he purpose of obtaining evidence of a commission
f an offense by soliciting and encouraging ano-

her person to engage in conduct constituting
hat offense by employing rn.ethods of persuasion
r inducement of the type which create a substanial risk that such an offense will be committed
y persons other than those who are ready to
ommit it.

The case should be reversed.

-1~-
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ARGUMENT II
IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PRESENT CASE
·'
THE SENTENCE IMPOSED CONSTITUTES A DENIAL OF
DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW, AND
VIOLATES THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT PROHIBITION AGAINST
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT, DUE TO THE EXISTENCE OF SEPARATE STATUTES WHICH PROVIDE DIFFERENT PUNISHMENTS FOR IDENTICAL CONDUCT; AND SINCE
THERE IS DOUBT OR UNCERTAINTY AS TO WHICH OF
SEVERAL PUNISHMENTS IS APPLICABLE, APPELLANTS
ARE ENTITLED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE LESSER.
Appellants were found guilty of the unlawful
sale of LSD and were sentenced to imprisonment
at the Utah State Prison.

The orders of comJ11it-

(R. 12, 14) issued pursuant to the sentence

ment

read as follows:
"The .i udgment and sentence of this Court is
that you,[John Cunningham and Dennis Parker]
be confined and imprisoned in the Utah State
Prison for an indeterminate term as provided
by law for the crime of unlawfully selling
an hallucinogenic drug as charged."
Appellants were charged with violation of
Utah Code Ann.,§ 58-3~-6 (1)

(19.)3. 1969 supp.)

which provides:
It shall be unJ awful for any person to
manufacture, compound, process, poss~ss,
have under his control, sell, prescribe,
administer, dispense, use or compound any
11
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l
depressant, stimulant or hallucinogenic or
other drug as defined herein except this
prohi~ition shall not ap~ly to the following
persons whose activities in connection wi~h
such drug are as specified in this eubsection:"
..... This statute then proceeds to exempt manuf acturer.c:, compounders, processors, pharm•-•cies,
hospitals,

research and educational

institutions~

wholesale druggists, public health agencies and
licensed physicians and non-drug uses of

peyo~e

by Indian members of the Native American Church

from the provisions of the drug abuse control law.
Utah Code Ann., § 58-33-6 (e) (1953, 1969
supp. ) provides:·
"Whenever the possession, sale, transfer or
dispensing of any drug or substance would constitute an offense under this act and also
constitutes an offense under the laws of this
state relating to the possession, sale, transfer or dispensing of drugs or marijuana, such
offense shall not be punishable under this
act but shall be punishable under the other
provisions of law."
This Court has recently made it perfectly
clear that the well-established rule is:
"That a statute creating a crime should be
sufficiently certain that persons of ordinary
intelligence who desire to obey the law may
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know how to conduct themselves in conformity
with it.
The fair and logical concomitant
of that rule is that such a penal statute
should be similarly clear, specific and
understandable as to the penalty imposed for
its violation. 11
State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P. 2d 146
(1969).
The Shondel case involved the determination
of the pruper penalty for possession of LSD.
One statute, Utah Code Ann., § 58-33, made the
offense a misdemeanor while § 58-13a made the
identical conduct a felony.
th~s

g

The language of

Court in construing a provision of

)8-13a-~4

(.i-), containing language identical

to that of ~ 58-33-6 (e), is as follows:
"This reference to 'such other provisions
of the law' leaves one concerned with compliance with the law to search elsewhere to
discover whether 'some other provision of
the law' dealing with narcotic drugs or
marijuana prescribe some other penalty for
the possession of LSD."
rhe equal protection of the law requires that the
_aws affect alike all persons similarly situated.
~he conflicting statutes were resolved so that

)hondel was entitled to the lesser penalty.
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In a similar case, State v.
4)··6 P.

'I
j-,)

2d 168

(1969),

Fair,

23 Utah 2d

this ~ourt ~gain ruled

:hat an accused is entitled to the benefit of
lesser penalty where the laws provide two dif-

~he

'erent penalties for the same conduct.

The case

_nvol ved a conviction for uttering a forged pre;cription,

a felony under 5 8-1 Ja- -~4,

le1r.eanor under 58-17-14.13.

but a mis-

Applying the Shondel

'ule, the case was remanded for resentencing as
misdemeanor under 58-17-1..1 .13.

l

Appellants herein submit that the rules laid
~wn

by this Court in Shondel and Fair are con-

;rolling in the instant case.
iS-17-1..J. .11 provides,

Utah Code Ann.,

in pertinent part:

"Any proprietor of a pharmacy or other person who shall sell, dispose of, or permit
the sale or disposition of any drug intended
for use by man . . . . . unless i~. is dispensed
upon a prescription of a doctor . . . . . is
guilty of an offense. 11
(emphasis added)
'he conduct which constitutes a violation of
58-33-6 -(1)

and 58-17-14.11 is identical.

The

enalty for a violation of 58-17-14.11 is found
n

g 58-17-26, and provides that a violation of

hat section is a misdemeanor.

Appellants sub-

it that the case at bar should therefore be
·ernanded for proper sentencing·
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While it is true that the drug LSD is not as
commonly used as stimulant drugs which are extensively prescribed primarily for relief of depression and for weight control or the nrnnerous
depressant drugs which are

P'-~escribed

in great

numbers as tranquilizers, the use of LSD in
treating chronic alcoholism as well as for the

'1 •'atment

of some cancer patients is quite well

documented.

The positive uses of this drug by

licensed medical practitioners is growing.

The

trial judge seemed to be of the opinion that LSD
was simply not the type of drug which is included within the meaning of
statute

:~_istinguishes

58-17-1~.ll,

but neither

the depressant or stimulant

from the hallucinogenic with respect to penalty.
The statute tmder which appellants were convicted and apparently sentenced has since been
repealed by the Utah Legislature effective January 1, 1972, Utah Code Ann.,g 58-37.

The penalty

provided in the new statute for the unlawful
sale of controlled substances,including LSD, is
a maximum of ten years, § 58-37-8 (b)

(ii)·

There is no minimum mandatory provision and the
statute clearly indicates a policy of pref erring
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~abilitation by probation and treatment for
0 ung

first offenders.

Where the legislature

hanges the law favorable to an accused,under
ertain circumstances the accused is entitled to
he favorable change in the law.
~,

2 6 Utah 2 d 3 9 2 ,

See State v.

4 9 0 P • 2 d 3 3 4 , and cases

ited therein.
Appellants submit that the Court in the case
t bar should also apply the principles set forth
n Belt v.

Turner,

25 Utah 2d 230,

479 P. 2d 791

l970), on reh. 25 Utah 2d 380, 483 P. 2d 425.
1e

f.egislatur8 has expressed an intent to lessen

.1e

penalty,

and modern and advanced

princip.l•~s

f jurisprudence should try and give effect to

he 1 esser sentence.
A careful reading of the orders of commitment

md sheriff's receipts (R. 12, 13, 14, 15) re'eals that the Court provided the sentence "as
>rovided by law" for the offense

11

as charged.

11

lowhere does the Court specifically set forth
~ich of several possible penalties within

I SS-33 were being applied.

The record shows

;hat defense counsel, the Court, and the prose:ut i ng attorney believed, throughout the trial'
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that the maximum penalty was five years (R. 26).
The actual determination of the term of imprisonment was made, not by the Court, but by the State
Prison I. D. Officer, one James W. Johnson (R. 12,

13, 14, 15).

The term of five years to life is

not set forth specifically in any

oth~r

part of

the record.
The only apparent source of this penalty is
found in §

58-3 3-4--( 3) which states in part:

"Every person who transports, imports into
this state, sells, furnishes, administers,
or gives away or offers to [do the same]
shall be punished by imprisonment in the
state prison from five years to life and
shall not be eligible for release upon completion of sentence or on parole or on any
other basis until he has served not less
than three ye•lrs."
But it is provided in Utah Code Ann., ~ 58-334 ( 6), that:
"Any person violating any other provisions
of this Chapter, except those mentioned in
the preceding four paragraphs, ..... shall
be punished for the first offense •.... for
not more than five years ..... "
And since appellants were charged with violating
11

other provisions" of the Chapter, it seems

clear that the penalty of no more than five years
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must also be applied if any part of
applies.

§

58-33 even

Appellants were charged only with a

violation of 58-33-6 (1), which nowhere indicates
a five year to life penalty.

Clearly, then,

there exists doubt and uncertainty as between
several different statutes and

p~nalties.

The Court automatically imposed a sentence of
imprisonment.

There is nothing to indicate why

tKo young first offenders who were entrapped into
delivering eight tablets of LSD to a team of narcotics agents were denied probation.

The report

prepared by the Adult Probation and Parole Department recommended probation.

The·ce is nothing in

their backgrounds to indicate that they are not
good probation material.

A five to life term,

if upheld by this Court, would violate the Constitutional guarantees of equal protection of
the law and the prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishments.

There is no rational justification

for the illegal five to life sentence and no distinction can be made between these appellants and
the thousands of other young people with similar
character and backgrounds, who are routinely
placed on probation in this jurisdiction for
similar offenses.
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This Court, in State v. Barlow, 25 Utah 2d

375, 483 P. 2d 236, held that a minimum mandatory provision of law does not preclude the
Court from placing a person on probation pursuant
to Utah Code Ann.)

§

77-35-17 (1953) where it

appears compatible with the public interest.
In the case of Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86
(1958), the Supreme Court of the United States
in a majority opinion by Chief Justice Warren

stated:
The basic purpose underlying the Eighth
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity
of man.
While the state has the power to
punish the Amendment stands to insure that
this power be exercised within the limits of
civilized standards.
Fine, imprisonment and
even execution may be imposed depending upon
the enormity of the crime ..... the Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that make the progress
of a maturing society. 11
11

On the basis of the Eighth Amendment, and
applying the rules of Shondel and

£..!!.!:,

appellants

respectfully submit that in the event that the
conviction itself be upheld that the case be
remanded for imposition of the proper sentence,
a misdemeanor, with recommendation for probation.
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CONCLUSION
It is respectfully contended from the fore~oing

arguments that appellants 1 convictions

~ould be reversed and the sentence set aside.
~lternati vely, the case should be remanded for
~esentencing

as a misdemeanor, with recommenda-

tion for probation.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN D. RUSSELL
Attorney for DefendantsAppellants
252 Canyon Road
Salt Lake City, Utah

84103
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